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II.

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction of an

appeal from an order of the Board of Natural Resources pursuant
to Utah Code Ann, § 78-2-2(3)(e)(iv) (1989).
III.

DEFINITION OF TERMS
This appeal includes the Appellant or Petitioner, Sam

Oil, Inc., which shall be referred to as "Sam Oil" or its alter
ego and owner, Steven A. Malnar, "Malnar"; the Respondent, BHP
Petroleum (Americas), Inc., which shall be referred to as "BHP";
and the Respondent, Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, of the Utah
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining, which shall be referred to as
the "Board."
A hearing was held before the Board on August 24, 1989,
and the transcript of that hearing shall be referred to as "TR"
followed by references to pages such as "TR 34".
All references to the designated Record will be cited
as "R" followed by the page number of the Record such as "R-034".
The hearing before the Board dealt with three
documents, (i) the Roosevelt Unit Agreement dated November 7,
1950, which will be referred to as the "Unit Agreement"; (ii) the
Operating Agreement for the Roosevelt Unit Area dated March 15,
1951, which will be referred to as the "Operating Agreement"; and
(iii) the Amendment to the Operating Agreement dated April 27,
1983, which will be referred to as the "Amendment".

It is

uncontroverted that all of these documents are legally executed,
valid and binding.
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The "Non-consent" penalty within the Operating
Agreement, is a standard provision utilized industry wide which
imposes a charge or penalty against any party who's money or
investment is not accounted for at the inception of the drilling
of the oil and gas well and thus, does not incur the extreme
risks attendant to the drilling of a well.
The Roosevelt Unit itself will be referred to as the
"Unit", what is known as a "federal" unit comprised of federal,
state and fee petroleum properties which are unitized under
federal law for the purposes of orderly and efficient
administration of unitized land and protection of correlative
rights.
The hearing also dealt with the Roosevelt Unit #6 Well
which will be referred to as the "#6 Well".
IV.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
A.

Should the Court accept the findings of fact of the

Board of Oil, Gas and Mining as being supported by "substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
Court"?
The standard of appellate review is set forth in the
Administrative Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 63-46b-l to 22
(1989).

Section 63-46b-16(4) (1989) states:
(4) The appellate court shall grant
relief only if, on the basis of the agencyfs
record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:

(g) the agency action is based upon a
determination of fact, made or implied by the
agency, that is not supported by substantial
evidence when viewed in light of the whole
record before the court; • • . .
B.

Should the Court should give deference to the

conclusions of the Board based on the Boardfs findings of facts,
that there are no special or equitable circumstances which would
excuse Sam Oil from being subject to all the terms of the
Amendment to the Roosevelt Unit Operating Agreement, including
the nonconsent penalty?
The Administrative Procedures Act has been reviewed by
the Court most recently in the case of First
Boston

v. County Board of Equalization

of Salt

National

Bank of

Lake County,

799

P.2d 1156 (1990), where "substantial evidence" under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (1989) was defined as ". . . that quantum
and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a
reasonable mind to support a conclusion." 799 P.2d 1156, 1165.
See also

Grace Drilling

v. Board of Review,

776 P.2d 63, 68

(Utah Ct.App. 1989).
C.

Should the Court rely on the Boardfs expertise in

oil and gas matters in order to interpret the scope of the Unit
Agreement, the Operating Agreement and the Amendment, and their
applicability to Sam Oil?
In the case of Utah Department
Services

v. Public

Service

Commission9

of

Administrative

658 P.2d 601 (1983), the

Court explained that factual questions sometimes lead to
determinations of "special law", which, by their very nature,
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require the expertise of the agency empowered by the legislature
to make such decisions.

The Court in reviewing such findings of

special laws, held that considerable weight should be given to
such findings.
Also among these intermediate issues are
the Commission's decisions on what can be
called "special law." These are the
Commission's interpretations of the operative
provisions of the statutory law it is
empowered to administer, especially those
generalized terms that bespeak a legislative
intent to delegate their interpretation to
the responsible agency. In reviewing agency
decisions of this type, we apply what we have
called the "time honored rule of law . . .
that the construction of statutes by
governmental agencies charged with their
administration should be given considerable
weight . . . ."
658 P.2d 601, at page 610, citing McPhie v.
Commission,
Department
V.

Industrial

567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977); West Jordan
of Employment Security,

v.

656 P.2d 411 (Utah 1982).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a matter which was

brought by Sam Oil, Inc. as petitioner before the Utah State
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §40-6-9
(1988), for an accounting as to oil and gas revenues allegedly
due from BHP Petroleum (Americas), Inc., the operator of the
Roosevelt Unit, a federally approved oil and gas unit covering
Indian lands and fee lands located in Uintah County, Utah.

The

relationship among the leaseholders and royalty or mineral
interest owners who hold interests within the boundaries of the
Unit is described in three agreements:

4-

The Unit Agreement which

was executed November 7, 1950 (R-0242), the Unit Operating
Agreement dated March 15, 1951 (R-0252), and the Amendment to the
Operating Agreement dated April 27, 1983 (R-0278).

Sam Oil is

the lessee, among others, of an oil and gas lease covering the
S^NE^ of Section 19, Township 1 South, Range 1 East, Uintah
Special Meridian, dated as of August 29, 1983, but executed and
acknowledged on November 2, 1983 (the "Lease") (R-0297), which
was obtained from a fee mineral interest owner of land within the
Unit, Hazel Robertson.

(Hazel Robertson has not participated in

nor is she a party to the Board hearing or this appeal.)

The

Lease was obtained after drilling on the #6 Well had commenced.
(Emphasis added.)

(TR 49)

Both Sam Oil and Hazel Robertson

joined the Unit after the Well was completed, tested and shown to
be a substantial producer, and ready for production. (R-0004)
BHP is the current operator of the deep rights in the Unit, which
includes the #6 Well, located the SW^SW^ of Section 20, Township
1 South, Range 1 East, Uintah Special Meridian.
The issue before the Board was whether Sam Oil is
subject to the nonconsent provision contained in the Amendment
which requires the operator of the Well to recoup 300% of Sam
Oil's share of the drilling and completion costs of the Well
before Sam Oil can share in the revenue.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

The

Board, after considering all of the evidence offered at a hearing
in the matter on August 25, 1989, found that substantial evidence
existed in the record as a whole to support its findings and
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ordered that Sam Oil was subject to the Amendment and could not
participate in the revenues in the #6 Well until 300% of its
share of the drilling and completion costs had been recouped by
other working interest owners from production.
A)

(R-0446; Addendum

The Petition seeking an accounting was dismissed because no

payments were due until the 300% penalty had been recouped from
the #6 Well. (BHP has provided to Sam Oil on a continuing basis
payout statements showing revenues, costs or expenses, and the
remaining nonconsent balance left to be recouped.)

On February

16, 1990, Sam Oil filed a Petition for Rehearing, and a hearing
on the Petition for Rehearing was held on March 22, 1990.

On

June 8, 1990, the Board issued an Order denying the Petition for
Rehearing.

(R-0444; Addendum B)

Sam Oil Sam Oil has appealed to

the Court seeking review of the Board's Orders.
VI.

SUMMARY OR ARGUMENTS
A.

The Court should not disturb the findings of the

Board since the findings were adequately supported by substantial
evidence as set forth in the Record.

Sam Oil is attempting to

avoid its contractual obligations to pay its fair share of the
drilling and completion costs of the #6 Well while, at the same
time, failing or refusing to place its investment or monies at
risk in the Well's drilling.

There is nothing in the Record to

support Sam Oil's contention that an exception should made in its
favor to the detriment of the other working interest owners in
the Unit.
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B.

The legal conclusion of the Board that Sam Oil

should be bound by the terms of the Amendment and the nonconsent
penalty is based on actual findings of the Board which is based
upon the evidence and testimony of the parties.

The "findings"

set forth by Sam Oil were not reached by the Board in making its
decision; the actual findings were sufficient as a matter of law
to make its legal conclusions.
C.

The record as a whole supports the findings of the

Board that Sam Oil should be subject to the nonconsent penalties
contained in the Amendment to the Unit Operating Agreement.
D.

The Board consists of highly qualified members who

have experience in oil and gas matters.

The Court should give

weight to the expertise of the Board in reviewing its findings.
VII.

ARGUMENT

A. THE COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB THE BOARD'S FINDINGS OF
FACT BECAUSE THE RECORD SUPPORTS THOSE FINDINGS.
1.

The Standard for Review is "Substantial

Evidence.
This Court recently established standards to be
utilized in the review of findings of fact and conclusions of law
by the an administrative agency.
Boston

In First

v. County Board of Equalization

National

of Salt

Bank of

Lake County,

799

P.2d 1156 (1990), the Court stated that the Administrative
Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. SS 63-46b-l to 22 (1989), requires
the
. . . appellate court to review the Mwhole
record" to determine whether the agencyfs
action is "supported by "substantial
-7-

evidence." "Substantial evidence" is that
quantum and quality of relevant evidence that
is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to
support a conclusion. See Console v. FMC,
383 U.S. 607, 620, 86 S.Ct. 1018, 1026-27, 16
L.Ed.2d 131 (1966); Idaho State Ins. Fund v.
Hunnicutt,
110 Idaho 257, 715 P.2d 927,
930-31 (1985); Grace Drilling
v. Board of
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct.App. 1989).
An appellate court applying the "substantial
evidence test" must consider both the
evidence that supports the Tax Commission's
factual findings and the evidence that
detracts from the findings. Nevertheless,
the party challenging the findings—in this
case, the taxpayer—must marshal all of the
evidence supporting the findings and show
that despite the supporting facts, the Tax
Commission's findings are not supported by
substantial evidence. 799 P.2d 1156, 1165.
The case before the Court is essentially a factual
case, and the Court is being asked to review factual
determinations made by the Board which lead to a legal conclusion
that Sam Oil is subject to the terms and conditions of a contract
(the Unit Agreement), in which it voluntarily joined.

There was

nothing before the Board concerning the interpretation of the
terms of Unit Agreement, the Operating Agreement or the
Amendment.

These Agreements and their terms and conditions are

uncontroverted.

The nonconsent provision is not at dispute and

its meaning is clear:

If Sam Oil doesnft participate in the

drilling of a well, the operator must recoup 300% of its share of
the drilling and completion costs of that well before it can
participate in the production attributable to its interest.
2.

The Review of Evidence is not a Trial de Novo.

In reviewing the findings of the Board, the Court
should not substitute its own conclusions it might have reached
-8-

had it been the original trier of fact.
Board of Review,

In Grace Drilling

v.

776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), the court said:

In undertaking such a review, this court
will not substitute its judgment as between
two reasonably conflicting views, even though
we may have come to a different conclusion
had the case come before us for de novo
review. [Citations omitted]. It is the
province of the Board, not appellate courts,
to resolve conflicting evidence, and where
inconsistent inferences can be drawn from the
same evidence, it is for the Board to draw
the inferences. 776 P.2d 63, 68.
B. THE BOARD HAD SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEFORE IT IN
REACHING ITS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
The Order of the Board dated April 25, 1990, lists 14
Findings of Fact.

Sam Oil listed the "findings of fact" in its

brief on pages 1 and 2.

Of the six "findings" listed, only

findings (i), (ii) and (iv) were actual findings of the Board.
Sam Oil goes on in its brief and attempts to show that there was
insufficient evidence to support "findings" (iii), (v) and (vi)
which, as stated, were not Board findings at all.

By elevating

assumptions of fact to findings of fact, Sam Oil then attempted
show why the Board's ultimate finding of law was unwarranted.
For example, according to Sam Oil, on page 2 of its Brief,
"finding" (v) provides:
Sam Oil delayed and did not elect to
participate in the #6 Well until it signed
the joinder documents in February 1984 after
the Well had been completed and Sam Oil had
known that the Well was a "good" well.
It is true that the Board found that the #6 Well was
completed on January 6, 1984, as a "good" well and that on
February 15, 1984, Sam Oil mailed the ratification and joinder
-9-

documents to the Unit operator, Rio Bravo Oil Company.

(R-0449)

But in reaching its conclusions, the testimony of Mr. Malnar gave
the the Board reason to believe that Sam Oil was riding the well
down free of charge to see if it were good before joining.

There

was testimony to the effect that he had knowledge of the #6 Well
and that he was watching it very closely.
Q. At the time you signed the ratification documents—
and that was around February 15, 198[4]—did you know
whether the Wasatch No. 6 Well had reached total depth?
A. [By Mr. Malnar]
had been—

Yes.

In February I knew that it

Q. Did you have any knowledge regarding what the
results of the drilling were?
A. Not at that time. All I know was that they said it
was a good well, because by then I had been dealing
with a phone caller to the Denver office, and I think
it was Dan Kropp said that the well was—looked like it
was going to be good. (TR 58)
To the extent that Sam attempts in its brief to
undermine the Board's findings which it didn't make, this Court
should disregard Sam's argument.

Taken as a whole, the

testimony, the exhibits and the legal arguments presented before
the Board allowed it to come to the critical legal conclusion
which is the central issue on appeal.

For example, Finding No. 3

of the Board states:
3. Prior to the commencement of drilling the
#6 Well, Sam Oil knew of the existence of the
unleased interest of Robertson. (R-0448)
This Finding is supported by Mr. Malnarfs testimony
where he stated that he ran " . . . across this unleased acreage.
It was kind of an accident."

(TR 50)
-10-

Later in his testimony he

admitted that he didn't obtain the lease from Hazel Robertson
until September, but that he back dated the lease to August 29th.
Q.

Why didn't you pick August 15?

A. [By Mr. Malnar] I don't know.
day that was picked.

I just—that is the

Q. Why not May, the first date you found out about the
lease?
A. We could have done that, too, because I did not
know for sure when the well spudded. (TR 85)
Finding No. 4 of the Board was also supported by Mr.
Malnar's testimony.
4. Sam Oil knew prior to the commencement of
drilling that the #6 Well would be drilled as
a Wasatch deep formation well. (R-0448)
Mr. Malnar contacted Hazel Robertson sometime in the
middle the month of September, 1983, and the #6 Well was spudded
on September 11, 1983.

(TR 80-82)

He then testified that he had

learned about "deep wells" prior to that.
A. I believe Don Johnson told me prior to this that
there was a possibility of some deep wells being
drilled in the Roosevelt Unit.
Q. Oh. So you may have known of this well prior to
the rigup?
A. I didn't know where it was going to be. There were
other wells drilling, too, that were shallow holes. I
had no idea. (TR 81-82)
Admittedly, Mr. Malnar has changed his testimony from
time to time, and it has been difficult to pinpoint the exact
moment he became aware of the depth planned for the #6 Well.

In

his Affidavit filed in support of the Motion for Rehearing, Mr.
Malnar claims that his conversation with Johnson was on October
-11-

10, 1983.

(R-095)

But in his letter to Phillips Petroleum dated

October 6, 1983, he proposes some "possible deep well ventures."
(R-0138)

So with at least three versions as to when he learned

of the plans for the deep well, coupled with his testimony that
he discovered the Hazel Robertson acreage in May, 1983, the Board
certainly had "substantial evidence" to make its finding.

Proper

procedure would have been for Sam Oil to lease the Robertson
acreage in May of 1983, and to submit a joinder to the Unit.

By

executing ratification and joinder documents after the #6 Well
was drilled, completed, and shown to be a significant producer,
Sam Oil attempted to avoid all of the risks, while at the same
time, enjoying all of the rewards.
C. THE COURT SHOULD GIVE DEFERENCE TO THE BOARD'S
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS BASED ON ITS FINDINGS OF FACTS.
1. The Board's Expertise is Needed under S 40-6-9
to Make the Findings in this Case,
In First
Equalization

of Salt

National

Bank of Boston

Lake County,

supra,

v. County Board of

the Court recognized

that the expertise of the administrative agencies must be
considered by the appellate court.

The expertise, howeverf must

be applied in a manner consistent with the agency's legislative
mandate.
Although it is a "universally recognized
rule" that this court must "take some
cognizance of the expertise of the agency in
its particular field and accordingly to give
some deference to its determination/' Utah
Power & Light Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 590
P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1979), the agency's
decision must rest upon some sound
evidentiary basis, not a creation of fiat.
799 P.2d 1156, 1166.
-12-

The Utah State Legislature has empowered the Board to
determine whether parties entitled to proceeds from oil and gas
wells are receiving those payments.
(1988).

Utah Code Ann. S 40-6-9

In making this determination in the case of Sam Oil, the

Board heard extensive testimony, examined a multitude of exhibits
submitted by the parties, and heard arguments of counsel from
both parties.

Based on these factors, the Board made factual

findings and conclusions of law, which rested on a "sound
evidentiary basis."
See also Utah Department
Service

Commission,

supra,

of Administrative

Services

v. PuJblic

where this Court said:

In reviewing decisions such as these, a court
should afford great deference to the
technical expertise or more extensive
experience of the responsible agency. 658
P.2d 601, 610.
The members of the Board come from a cross section of
interests and backgrounds. Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-4(2) (1983)
provides:
2. The board shall then consist of seven
members appointed by the governor, with the
advice and consent of the Senate. No more
than four members shall be from the same
political party. The members shall have the
following qualifications:
(a) two members knowledgeable in mining
matters;
(b) two members knowledgeable in oil and gas
matters;
(c) two members knowledgeable in ecological
and environmental matters;

-13-

(d) one member who is a private land owner,
owns a mineral or royalty interest and is
knowledgeable in those interests; and
(e) one member who is knowledgeable in
geological matters.
Each of these individuals has been chosen to give the
Board the necessary breadth of experience to review natural
resource matters.

Because of the experience of the Board and

its understanding of the complexities of unitization agreements,
we would urge this Court to give deference to the Boardfs
findings which have been amply supported by the record.
2.

The Board's Legal Conclusion was Supported by

the Record as a Whole.
The central finding of the Board is its Conclusion of
Law No. 4 which provides as follows:
4. As a rule, under the Unit Agreement and
Unit Operating Agreement, as amended, the
lessee of an uncommitted interest who commits
that interest to the unit subsequent to the
commencement of the well, would be subject to
the nonconsent penalty provided in the Unit
Operating Agreement, as amended. However,
there may be unique circumstances where, as a
matter of equity, the general rule would not
apply. The Board does not find such
circumstances
to exist in this
case.
Consequently, Sam Oil is subject to the 300%
nonconsent penalty provided in the Unit
Operating Agreement, as amended. (Emphasis
added). (R-0451)
There are adequate facts in the transcript alone to
support the Board's legal conclusion that this case did not call
for equity:
a.

Mr. Malnar knew as early as May that there was

uncommitted acreage which could be leased and he believed that
-14-

the entire Roosevelt Unit was a "sweet spot", not risky for the
drilling of wells.
b.

(TR 49-50).

He convinced Hazel Robertson to lease her land on

the basis that there was a deep well being drilled, and back
dated the lease prior to the spudding date.

(TR 49)

(In effect,

by leasing from her, he obtained 7/8ths of the production and
left her with l/8th, even though he did not participate in the
drilling of the well.

Had he not taken the lease, Hazel

Robertson would have had the opportunity to either participate in
the well or wait for a 300% payout and then receive 8/8ths of her
interest.)
c.
Agreement.

He agreed that he is bound by the terms of the Unit
(TR 91)

d.

His expert witness, Phillip Lear, testified that at

a certain point the risk has been borne by the participants and
it isn't fair to let someone else in.
e.

(TR 130).

His expert also testified that there is a basis for

difference of opinion as to when the penalty should apply when no
notice is given.
f.

(TR 139).

Finally, his expert testified that the operator of

the Unit could be forced to pay revenues twice if the nonconsent
penalty were not imposed.
g.

(TR 141) .

There was testimony that BHP made good faith

efforts to locate and notify Hazel Robertson.
209)
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(TR 164; 167; 205-

h.

There was testimony that there was no delay in

responding to Sam Oil by BHP.
i.

(TR 170)

There was evidence that Mr. Malnar was sent copies

of Unit Agreement and Amendment had been sent to Mr. Malnar.
(TR 179)
j.

There was evidence and testimony that Sam Oil's

execution of the ratification and joinder documents to the Unit
ocurred after the #6 Well was drilled and completed.
k.

(TR 58)

There was evidence that an official of the

Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, Mr. Ed
Guynn had recommended the imposition of the 300% penalty.

(TR

188)
1.

There was testimony to the effect that if Sam Oil

had been allowed to participate after spudding he wouldn't have
been at risk.
m.

(TR 195)
Finally, there was testimony that a 300% nonconsent

penalty is reasonable for the risks taken in the drilling of a
deep well in the Unit.

(TR 225).

Based on the total universe of facts presented to the
Board, the opportunity of the Board to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses, and the Board's expertise in the effect of
unitization agreements, a legal finding was made that there were
no equitable reasons why the provisions of the nonconsent penalty
shouldn't apply.

BHP submits that this finding should receive

"considerable weight."
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D. LEGAL AUTHORITIES WHEN READ IN THE LIGHT OF CUSTOM
IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY SUPPORT THE ASSESSMENT OF THE 300%
PENALTY PRIOR TO ALLOWING SAM OIL TO PARTICIPATE IN THE #6 WELL.
1.

Custom in the Oil and Gas Industry Dictates

the Imposition of a Nonconsent Penalty.
Before examining the cases cited by Sam Oil, it would
be helpful to review some of the factors and customs that drive
the oil and gas business.

There are several realities in the oil

business which influence the weight of the testimony and evidence
presented before the Board.
First, most drilling tracts are owned by multiple
mineral interest owners or lessees of that interest, and
generally, only one well is permitted to produce the oil which
will adequately drain a designated area.

The Bureau of Land

Management, if the land is in a federal unit, or the Division of
Oil, Gas and Mining, if it is a fee or state unit, decides where
the well can be drilled.

That decision defines which mineral

interest owners are included within the drilling unit.

(A

drilling unit under federal jurisdiction is called a
"participating area" within a unitized area and can include many
wells and large acreage tracts; by contrast, under Utah State
law, a drilling unit contains a prescribed amount of acreage
which has been "spaced" or defined by the Board and is limited to
two producing wells.

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 [1988]).

Second, because drilling an oil well is an
extraordinarily expensive, risky project, it is in the best
interests of the drilling party (the operator in most cases) to
-17-

include as many parties in the sharing of the risk and the
expenses.

If an interest owner does not wish to take the risk

and not make capital contributions, that owner is deemed to be a
nonconsenting owner and does not participate in the drilling,
testing or completing of the well.

By not sharing the risk with

the operator and other consenting owners, he is charged a
••penalty" of a percentage of the cost to drill and complete the
well which is recouped from production.

At such time as the

penalty is recouped (penalties range from 200% to 1000% with 300%
being common in the industry and is the amount provided in the
Amendment to the Operating Agreement), the interest owner begins
to receive his share of the production less expenses.
In the case before the Court, Sam is characterizing
BHP's inability to find and notify Hazel Robertson about the #6
Well as an attempt to assess the nonconsent penalty.

In fact,

most of Samfs brief focuses on notice and opportunity to join.
Because of the highly speculative nature of the oil business, no
prudent operator would drill a well depending on the nonconsent
penalty to finance the project.

If the well is a dry hole, or if

it fails to pay out 100% of the costs, then the operator has lost
its investment and gets nothing from the Sam Oils of the world.
It doesn't make sense to take on the risk of drilling a well,
paying 100% of the costs, and then, at payout, contact the other
owners and let them participate without any penalty.

If that

were the law there would never be any oil produced in this State
unless the operator controlled 100% of the mineral rights.
-18-

Sam

Oil totally ignors its actions and does not explain its complete
failure to put its money at risk.
2.

The Unit Agreement and the Amendment to the

Operating Agreement Require the Imposition of a Nonconsent
Penalty.
The rules for participating in a well in the Roosevelt
Unit are spelled out in paragraph 27 of the Roosevelt Unit
Agreement.

(R-0242)

When the Unit was formed, the parties to

the agreement had to demonstrate to the Secretary of the Interior
that they held " . . . sufficient interests in the Roosevelt Unit
Area covering the land hereinafter described to give reasonably
effective control of operations therein; . . . ."

(R-0242)

Under current regulations all parties must have the opportunity
to join.
The owners of any right, title, or interest
in the oil and gas deposits to be unitized
are regarded as proper parties to a proposed
agreement. All such parties must be invited
to join the agreement. If any party fails or
refuses to join the agreement, the proponent
of the agreement, at the time it is filed for
approval, must submit evidence of reasonable
effort made to obtain joinder of such party
and, when requested, the reasons for such
nonjoinders. 43 CFR § 3181.3
Since the date the Unit was formed in 1950, all of the
interest owners and any other nonjoinders in the Unit area have
had a continuing opportunity to join the Unit.

For whatever

reason, the holder of the J. R. Robertson interest (now owned by
Hazel Robertson) chose not to join the Unit.

Being in the Unit

means that the participants within a participating area share in
-19-

the oil and gas production according to their proportionate share
of mineral interest in their acreage, divided by the total number
of acres in the participating area.

A member of the Unit shares

in all of the production in the participating area.

This is true

even if the producing well happens to be located on the property
owned by the Unit member.

Hence, one could gamble and not join a

unit and hope that a well will someday be drilled on his
property.

Or, he can take a more conservative approach, join the

unit and participate in a lesser degree in all of the unit wells
with the hope that the total production will eventually be equal
to or greater than the production which might have been realized
from a well on his tract.
In the case before the Court, the #6 Well is located
off the Hazel Robertson property.

Hence, the only way she and

Sam Oil were able to share in the proceeds of the Unit was to
join the Unit.

It is conjecture to speculate as to why the

Robertson interest had not joined the Unit prior to 1984 even
though the Unit has been in existence since 1950.

(As a royalty

owner, Hazel Robertson is not at risk; as such, she has been
receiving royalty payments since her joinder.)

Mr. Malnar has

known about the Unit long before the #6 Well was drilled
85)

(TR 73,

Sam Oil waited to see if the #6 Well would be a producer and

then he attempted to create, in retrospect, a series of events
that would somehow show that Mr. Malnar wanted to pay his share
of drilling expenses and participate in the well but was denied
the opportunity to do so.

The Board determined that Sam Oil had
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knowledge and the opportunity to join the Unit but never acted
upon it.
Once Sam Oil and Hazel Robertson made a decision to
join the Unit, they were permitted to do so in accordance with
the provisions of Paragraph 27 of the Unit Agreement.

The offer

to join the Unit had been on the table for thirty-four years when
the holders of the J. R. Robertson interest decided to accept.
Sam Oil, however, believes that there is a continuing obligation
to search out nonjoinders and reiterate the offer to join.

He

could cite nothing to substantiate that position, and indeed,
case law is to the contrary.
3.

Case Law Supports the Imposition of a

Nonconsent Penalty.
Cases cited by Sam Oil support the Board's findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
California

Company v. Britt,

For example, the court in
154 So.2d 144 (Miss. 1963), said:

Owners of royalty or unleased mineral
interests are entitled to come into a
unitization program under fair, reasonable,
and equitable terms with other participants
in the unit, similarly situated. 154 So.2d
144, 150.
The Board found no equitable considerations which would
have authorized it to abandon the contractual conditions set
forth in the Unit Agreement and allow Sam Oil to join the Unit
but to ignore the penalty provisions called for under the
Amendment of the Operating Agreement.
California

Company v. Britt,

The test set forth in

calls for terms which are fair and

similar to those terms which would be applied to any other
-21-

similarly situated party.

It is not fair and equitable to force

those parties who have previously joined the unit to bear the
risk of participating in the #6 Well and then turn around and
allow Sam Oil to avoid the penalty for sitting on the sidelines
while waiting for the Well to be drilled.

Sam Oil's brief

emphasizes his alleged desire to get into the Unit prior to the
completion of the Well.

The record shows, however, that Sam knew

that the interest of Hazel Robertson was unleased for five months
before the Well was commenced.

(TR 85)

Indeed, his motivation

for obtaining the lease was the knowledge that the Well had
commenced.

Once the operator has committed for the drilling rig

and the rig has been mobilized, the participants1 money is at
risk.

Each day that drilling continues, more money is spent and

it is gone until production is obtained and marketed.

Even if

Sam Oil had ratified the Unit on the day after the Well was
spudded, it still would have been subject to the nonconsent
penalties assessed under the Operating Agreement and the
Amendment.

Once the Unit has been formed, notice is no longer a

factor, and the contractual provisions of the Unit Agreement, the
Operating Agreement and the Amendment take over.
Sam Oil also cites the case of Boggess

v. Milam,

34

S.E. 2d 267 (W. Va. 1945), for the proposition that BHP had an
obligation to contact Sam Oil prior to the drilling of the #6
Well and offer it an opportunity to join the Unit.
California

Company v. Britt

decision of the Board.

case,

In Boggess,
-22-

Boggess

Like

v. Milam supports the

the nonjoining party held

acreage off of the drilling site, as is the case before the
Court.

Boggess, like Sam Oil, sought to have the court apply

equitable principles in order to obtain an interest in production
off of his leased tract.

The court said:

We have been unable to find a case in which,
with no contractual obligation to be
considered, the owner of land has been held
to have an interest, legal or equitable, in
the oil and gas underlying adjoining or
adjacent lands in which he holds no title.
34 S.E. 2d 267, 269.
And yet, Sam Oil would have this Court apply equitable
principles to make an exception to the rules established by the
Unit Operating Agreement, and excuse the nonconsent charges
assessed it so that Sam can participate without penalty in the #6
Well located off of its leased tract.

The court went on to hold

that
. . . a tenant in common, particularly one
holding a minor interest in the oil and gas,
is not to be allowed, by withholding his
consent to the development of the boundary in
which his interest lies, to prevent the
development of an adjoining tract under a
unitization agreement to which he has been an
equal opportunity to become a party and in
which his cotenants have all joined. 34 S.E.
2d 267, 271.
Sam Oil asserts that this holding supports its theory
that Hazel Robertson should have been notified prior to the
drilling of the #6 Well, and that because she wasnft notified,
Sam Oil can assume her position and claim that it received no
notice.

This, in spite of the fact the Samfs president and alter

ego, Steven Malnar, knew about the unleased interest and the
possibility of the Well long before he obtained the lease from
-23-

Hazel Robertson.

Malnar also testified that he back-dated the

lease to the date that the drilling of the Well commenced, even
though it was actually executed some three or four weeks after
drilling began.

(TR 85)

As stated above, the Robertson interest

has had ample opportunity for joinder, and the holders of that
interest had, prior to 1984, decided not to join.
There was no obligation on the part of BHP or any other
operator to notify nonjoinders about the contemplated well.
Nevertheless, BHP made efforts to find Mrs. Robertson because it
was in its best interests to have as many parties as possible
participate in the venture.

The fact that BHP was not able to

find her and give her this latest notice does not allow Sam Oil
to climb into her shoes and claim that it had no notice when, in
fact, Sam's president had known for some time about the Well. BHP
fulfilled its duty in trying to locate Hazel Robertson, and Sam
Oil does not become the recipient of some higher duty on the part
of BHP which would allow equity to throw out the contractual
provisions of the Operating Agreement and permit Sam Oil to
participate without paying 300% of the drilling and completion
costs of the #6 Well.

Further, Sam Oil has no standing to

complain about notice to Hazel Robertson; she has never
complained about not having been located and given notice of the
drilling proposal.

BHP has fulfilled its obligation to Hazel

Robertson and owes nothing further to Sam Oil other than to
properly apply revenues to the nonconsent penalty and advise Sam
Oil at such time as the nonconsent penalty has been satisfied.
-24-

VIII.

CONCLUSION
This is a factual dispute which has been considered

twice by the Board.

There is more than ample evidence to support

the Board's finding that Sam Oil is subject to the nonconsent
provisions of the Unit Operating Agreement and Amendment, and
that the working interest owners may recoup 300% of the drilling
and completion costs of the #6 Well before Sam Oil begins
participating in the proceeds of the #6 Well.

The Board has been

designated by the Legislature to make the kinds of findings it
made in this case, and this Court should not revisit those facts
unless there has been a showing of an arbitrary and capricious
decision.
showing.

The record taken as a whole does not support such a
Thus, BHP respectfully requests the Court to affirm the

Board's Orders.
DATED December 18, 1990.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

John P. Harrington
Alan A. Enke
Attorneys for BHP Petroleum
(Americas), Inc.
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF SAM OIL,
INC.,
Petitioner,
vs.
BHP PETROLEUM (AMERICAS),
INC.,
Respondent.

]
i
;
i
]
i

ORDER
Docket No. 89-008
Cause No. 131-82

j
]

This matter was heard before the Board of Oil, Gas and
Mining at its regularly scheduled hearing at 10:00 a.m. on
August 24, 1989 in the boardroom of the Division of Oil, Gas
and Mining, 355 West North Temple, 3 Triad Center, Suite 350,
Salt Lake City, Utah.

The following Board Members,

constituting a quorum, were present and participated in the
hearing and in the decision embodied herein:
Gregory P. Williams, Chairman
Richard B. Larsen
Judy F. Lever
E. Steele Mclntyre
Kent G. Stringham
John M. Garr was absent from parts of the hearing and abstained
from the decision of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining.
Members of the staff of the Division of Oil, Gas and
Mining present at and participating in the hearing included:

Dr. Dianne R. Nielson, Director
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining
Ronald J. Firth, Associate Director, Oil and Gas
Division of Oil, Gas and Mining
Barbara W. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General of the
State of Utah, also participated in the hearing on behalf of
the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining,
The following appeared at the hearing:
Steven W. Dougher.ty
HANSEN & ANDERSON
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Petitioner SAM Oil, Inc.
John P. Harrington
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Respondent BHP Petroleum
(Americas), Inc.
Testimony was received from and exhibits were
introduced on behalf of Petitioner SAM Oil, Inc. by Steven A.
Malnar, President of SAM Oil, and Phillip Wm. Lear, Attorney at
Law, of the law firm of Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy.
Mr. Lear was recognized by the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining as
an oil and gas law expert in the context of this matter.
Testimony was received from and exhibits were introduced on
behalf of Respondent BHP Petroleum (Americas), Inc. by Jerry
Bair, District Land Manager of BHP Petroleum (Americas), Inc.
In addition, portions of the testimony of Daniel P. Kroop,
formerly a landman for BHP, were read into the record.
The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, having considered

-2-

the testimony, exhibits, and evidence presented and the
statements made by the participants at the hearing, now makes
and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

BHP was the operator of the Roosevelt Unit #6 Well

(the "#6 Well") and as such commenced and drilled the well.
The well was spudded on September 11, 1983.
2.

Hazel M. Robertson ("Robertson") was the owner

of an unleased interest in the area for the #6 Well.

Prior to

spudding, BHP contacted other working interest owners to invite
them to participate in the #6 Well but BHP did not contact
Robertson.
3.

Prior to the commencement of drilling the #6 Well,

SAM Oil knew of the existence of the unleased interest of
Robertson.
4.

SAM Oil knew prior t o t h e commencement of drilling

that the #6 Well would be drilled as a Wasatch deep formation
well.
5.

On or about September 29, 1983, SAM Oil obtained

an oil and gas lease from Robertson to be effective as of first
production (approximately 1949).

On or about November 2, 1983,

SAM Oil obtained an oil and gas lease from Robertson, to be
effective as of August 29, 1983.
first.

The second lease replaced the

At the time these leases were given, and prior thereto,
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the Robertson interest had not been committed to the Roosevelt
Unit.
6.

On or about October 6, 1983, SAM Oil wrote to

Phillips Petroleum expressing an interest in joining the
Roosevelt Unit.
acreage*

The letter did not identify particular-

Phillips Petroleum responded by stating that the

letter had been referred to Rio Bravo as the operator.
7.

On or about October 26, 1983, Rio Bravo

responded by letter to SAM Oil describing the procedures for
joinder.
8.

On or about January 4, 1983, Rio Bravo sent SAM

Oil a letter transmitting ratification and joinder documents to
be signed by Robertson, ratification and joinder documents to
be signed by SAM Oil, and copies of the Unit Agreement and Unit
Operating Agreement.

SAM Oil maintains that the April 27, 1983

amendment to the Unit Operating Agreement was not included with
these materials.

BHP maintains that it was standard procedure

to include all amendments.

This amendment changes the

so-called nonconsent penalty from 150% to 300%.
9.

The #6 Well was completed on January 6, 1984 as

a "good" well.
10.

On or about February 15, 1984, SAM Oil mailed

the signed ratification and joinder documents to Rio Bravo.

In

December 1984 the Bureau of Land Management approved the
joinder effective as of June 1, 1984.
11.

BHP did not at any time request that SAM Oil pay
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a proportionate share of the drilling costs of the #6 Well,
12.

SAM Oil did not at any time tender to BHP a

proportionate share of the drilling costs of the #6 Well.
13.

The Board finds no factual circumstances unique

to this case which require, as a matter of equity, that SAM
Oil's leasehold interest in the Roosevelt Unit #6 Well not be
subject to the 300% nonconsent penalty provided in the Unit
Operating Agreement, as amended.
14.

The #6 Well has not yet paid out 300% of the

appropriate costs of drilling, completing and equipping the
Well and, therefore, no proceeds are owed to SAM Oil.
Consequently, it is not necessary to examine the costs of
drilling, completing and equipping the #6 Well at this time or
as part of this cause,

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Due and regular notice of the time, place, and

subject matter of this hearing in Docket No. 89-008, Cause
No. 131-82 was given to all interested persons in accordance
with applicable law and with the rules, practices, and orders
of the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining pertaining to this matter.
2.

The Petition of SAM Oil, Inc. in this matter was

properly before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining at the
hearing, and the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining has jurisdiction
over the matters contained therein.
3.

The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining has received and
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duly considered adequate, substantial evidence to support its
decision herein, and that decision is supported by such
evidence.
4.

As a rule, under the Unit Agreement and Unit

Operating Agreement, as amended, the lessee of an uncommitted
interest who commits that interest to the unit subsequent to
the commencement of the well, would be subject to the
nonconsent penalty provided in the Unit Operating Agreement, as
amended.

However, there may be unique circumstances where, as

a matter of equity, the general rule would not apply.

The

Board does not find such circumstances to exist in this case.
Consequently, SAM Oil is subject to the 300% nonconsent penalty
provided in the Unit Operating Agreement, as amended.
5.

Since SAM Oil is not presently entitled to any

payments from BHP because of the application of the 300%
nonconsent penalty provision, no issue exists as to whether
sums have been improperly withheld or whether interest or
penalties under § 40-6-9 are warranted.
6.

The Board has authority to enter the order set

forth below.
ORDER
1.
dismissed.

The Petition of SAM Oil, Inc. is hereby
Such dismissal is without prejudice to the right of

SAM Oil to institute appropriate proceedings for an accounting
of the costs of drilling, completing and equipping the #6 Well.
2.

The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining retains
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continuing jurisdiction over all matters covered by this Order
and over all persons affected hereby for the purpose of making
such further orders and taking such further actions as the
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining may deem appropriate in accordance
with applicable laws and with the rules of the Board.
Entered this^^^day of April, 1990.
STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING

illiams, Chairman
0613G
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BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo—
IN THE MATTER OF SAM OIL, INC.,
PETITIONER, VS. BHP PETROLEUM
(AMERICAS), INC., RESPONDENT

:

ORDER

:

DOCKET NO. 89-008
CAUSE NO. 131-82

-—ooOoo
This matter was heard before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining at
its regularly scheduled hearing at 10:00 a.m. on March 22, 1990 in the
boardroom of the Division of Oil, Qas and Mining, 355 West North Temple,
3 Triad Center, Suite 350, Salt Lake City, Utah. The following Board
Members, constituting a quorum, were present and participated in the
hearing and in the decision embodied herein:
Gregory P. Williams, Chairman
James W. Carter
John M. Garr
Richard B. Larsen
Judy F. Lever
E. Steele Mclntyre
Kent G. Stringham
The following appeared at the hearing:
Steven W. Dougherty
ANDERSON & WATKINS
50 West Broadway, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John P. Harrington
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
The petitioner has requested the Board to rehear Docket No. 89-008,
Cause No. 131-82. The Board has considered the record from the August
24, 1989, hearing as well as the documentation and arguments presented
at this hearing.

ORDER
The Petition of SAM Oil, Inc. for rehearing is denied.
Entered this 8th day of June, 1990.
STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING

illiams, Chairman

bid
AW/Orders

Exhibit C

40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production — Payment of
proceeds — Requirements — Proceeding on petition to determine cause of nonpayment — Remedies — Penalties.
(1) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of production from any
well producing oil, gas, or related hydrocarbons in the state shall be paid to all
persons legally entitled to these payments commencing not later than 180
days after the first day of the month following the date of first sale and
thereafter not later than 30 days after the end of the calendar month within
which payment is received by the payor for production unless other periods or
arrangements are provided for in a valid contract with the person entitled to
the proceeds. The payment shall be made directly to the person or persons
entitled to the payment by the payor. The payment is considered to have been
made upon deposit in the United States mail.
(2) Payments shall be remitted to the person or persons entitled to proceeds
from production annually for the aggregate of up to 12 months accumulation
of proceeds if the total amount owed is $100 or less.
(3) Any delay in determining any person legally entitled to an interest in
the proceeds from production does not affect payments to all other persons
entitled to payment. In instances where accrued payments cannot be made for
any reason within the time limits specified in Subsection (2), the payor shall
deposit all proceeds credited to the eventual oil and gas proceeds owner to an
escrow account in a federally insured bank or savings and loan institution
using a standard escrow document form which deposit shall earn interest at
the highest rate being offered by that institution for the amount and term of
such demand deposits. The escrow agent may commingle money received into
escrow from any one lessee or operator, purchaser, or other party legally
responsible for payment. Payment of principal and accrued interest from these
accounts shall be paid by the escrow agent to all persons legally entitled to
them within 30 days from the date of receipt by the escrow agent of final legal
determination of entitlement to the payment. Applicable escrow fees shall be
deducted from the payments.

(4) Any party entitled to proceeds of production in oil and gas may file a
petition with the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining to conduct a hearing to determine why these proceeds have not been paid.
(5) Upon receipt of the petition the board shall set the matter for investigation and negotiation by the division within 60 days.
(6) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of that date, the board
may set a hearing within 30 days. If the board does not set a hearing, all
information gathered during the investigation and negotiation shall be given
to the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in the court system.
(7) If, after a hearing, the board finds the payment of proceeds delay is
without reasonable justification, it may order a complete accounting and require the proceeds and interest to be paid into an interest bearing escrow
account and set a date not later than 90 days for final distribution. The board
may also assess a penalty of up to 25% of the proceeds and interest at the rate
of 1V2% per month from the date of delinquency until paid upon finding that
the delay of payment of proceeds was known and intentional.
(8) The penalty provisions of this chapter do not apply in the following
instances:
(a) the payor fails to make such payment otherwise required under this
section in good faith reliance upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah
attorney objecting to the lack of good and marketable title of record in the
party claiming entitlement to payment and furnishes a copy of the opinion to the party for necessary curative action;
(b) the payor receives information which, in the payor's good faith judgment, brings into question the entitlement of the person claiming the
right to the payment to receive that payment or which has rendered
unmarketable the title of the payment, or which may expose the payor to
the risk of multiple liability or liability to third parties if the payment is
made. In that event, the payor may suspend those payments otherwise
required by this chapter or, at the request and expense of the party claiming entitlement whereupon the payor's own initiative, may interplead
such fund in the manner provided by law in order to resolve such claims
and avoid liability under this chapter;
(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession of the payor
owed to the owner thereof making claim to payment is less than $100 at
the end of any month; or
(d) the party entitled to payment has failed or refused to execute a
division or transfer order acknowledging the proper interest to which the
party claims to be entitled and setting forth the mailing address to which
payment may be directed.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I duly mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Respondent BHP Petroleum (Americas), Inc.'s
Brief and Addendum, postage prepaid, this
1990, to the following parties:
R. Paul Van Dam, Esq.
Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq.
Attorney General of Utah
236 State Capital Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent
Utah Board of Oil, Gas
& Mining
Steven W. Dougherty, Esq.
ANDERSON & WATKINS
700 Valley Tower
50 W. Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2018
Attorneys for Petitioner
Sam Oil, Inc.

[Q

day of December,

